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Abstract 
Author: Manuela Jaramillo 
Title: The Effects of System Reliability and Task Uncertainty on Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle Operator Performance under High Time Pressure 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Year: 2011 
For many years, the military has understood the value and versatility of Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (UAS). In the recent years, UASs have sparked the interest of other fields, and in 
the very near future, they will be introduced into the National Airspace System (NAS). 
With this inclusion come new concerns. Due to the future wide range applications for 
UASs, it is important to explore factors, which may affect operator performance. The 
UAS operator task differs from that of a manned aircraft pilot. An UAS operator does not 
get the same sensory cues as a pilot and their field of vision is significantly restricted 
among other limitations. 
This study examined the effects of system reliability and task uncertainty on UAS 
operator performance, measuring image processing accuracy and image processing time 
through a primary task and three secondary tasks. The primary task was image 
processing that entailed differentiating between targets and distracters, making necessary 
changes to the identifications provided by the automation and processing images 
accurately within a five-second window. There were also three secondary tasks that are 
typical of UAS operations to which the participants had to respond as quickly as they 
could. Both system reliability and task uncertainty were found to be significant for 
primary task image processing time. In contrast, accuracy was not found to be 
significantly affected by either one of the independent variables. The results are 
examined, and recommendations for future research are discussed. 
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Introduction 
UAS Background 
For many years, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have been widely used by the 
branches of the military in the United States. These systems have demonstrated time and 
time again how versatile, effective, and useful they can be. For these reasons, it was 
expected that by 2010, 1 out of every 3 military aircraft would be operated remotely 
(Pedersen, Cooke, Pringle, & Connor, 2006). For now, UASs fly in restricted zones just 
for them but this will soon change. UASs will be introduced to the National Airspace 
System (NAS) in the near future, which has sparked some concerns. The branches of the 
military have primarily used UASs for reconnaissance and attack missions. With the 
revamping of the NAS, the reality of more UASs being utilized for missions other than 
military applications is closer than ever. The expansion of UAS operations has the 
potential to change aviation forever. Moreover, with the increased potential uses of 
UASs, it is suggested that the use of UASs in an "urban close-air support"' will be 
invaluable in the years to come, when undertakings like the war on terror creates 
missions that are more urban in nature (Hottman & Sortland, 2006). 
The environment and intended mission scenarios in which UASs operate differ 
significantly. These technologies have advanced to the point where their applications can 
be useful for many practical purposes such as drug banning, border monitoring, law 
enforcement, agriculture, communication relays, aerial photography and mapping, 
emergency management, and scientific and environmental research. For some of these 
fields, UASs are already in use but not quite as extensive as it could be. To suffice for 
each intended domain of operation, user-interfaces would ultimately need to be designed 
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in a fashion that allows for the most effective means of operation, thereby requiring 
different operating tasks on behalf of the UAS pilots (Hottman & Sortland, 2006). 
UASs have been around for approximately 100 years, but it hasn't been until 
recently that their capabilities have been recognized. Shortly after World War I, UAS 
technologies really began to develop, following the advent of automatic stabilization, 
remote control, and autonomous navigation advancements. Today, the military relies 
heavily on UAS to conduct missions that would otherwise be too boring, risky, or 
impractical for manned flight. These missions are often referred to as the "Dull, Dirty, or 
Dangerous" (Hottman & Sortland, 2006). The enormous growth of military interest 
towards UAS is a direct result of their proven performance and capabilities in the realm 
of surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering, and more recently- attack 
missions (Hottman & Sortland, 2006). Furthermore, UASs accomplish this effort without 
putting American pilots' lives in danger, due to the missions being remotely flown by 
operators residing within the U.S. borders, not in the hostile airspace. While the idea 
behind unmanned flight is to avoid the risk to human life, there is still a cost associated 
with losing a UAS; accident rates for UASs far exceed those of manned aircraft. 
Moreover, according to Sniezek et al., "an industry analysis has shown that over 70% of 
accidents can be attributed to human error" (2001). While proper pilot selection and 
training can greatly reduce accidents, it is by no means the only solution to reducing 
human error in UAS flights; effective training along with proper automation, user-
friendly interfaces, and appropriate procedures can together make a positive impact in the 
safety record of UASs (Parush, 2006). 
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Within the United States, there are four different possible markets that could 
potentially benefit from the expansion of UAS operations: military, civil government, 
research, and commercial applications (Reynolds, 2009). Each market will have its own 
set of rules provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Therefore it is 
important for the FAA to have full understanding of future implementations of UASs in 
those specific domains since not only will the rules change for each domain, but for the 
UAS operators as well. Consequently, the success of UAS operations in each market 
could depend on the constraints imposed on the operation. 
Currently, there is no universally supported definition for modern-day UASs. In 
the UAS Roadmap, the Department of Defense (DoD) defines these systems as: 
A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses 
aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted 
remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal 
payload. Ballistic or semi ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery 
projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles (Department of Defense, 
2005). 
The FAA defines an UAS as: 
An airplane, airship, powered lift, or rotorcraft that operates with the pilot in 
command off-board, for purposes other than sport or recreation. It is also known 
as unmanned aerial vehicle. UASs are designed for recovered and reused. A UAS 
includes all parts of the system (data-link, control station, and so forth) required to 
operate the aircraft (American Society of Testing and Materials, 2005). 
In either definition, a pilot is not co-located within the flying component of the 
system. For this reason, human factors concerns are raised regarding the pilot and their 
integration into the system for effective operations (Hottman & Sortland, 2006). 
UASs come in two varieties: some are controlled from a remote location, and 
others fly autonomously based on pre-programmed flight plans using more complex 
dynamic automation systems. For both types, though, an operator has to be in the loop, 
where the operator interacts with the system, to either control the UAS or supervise it. In 
many of the supervisory instances, UASs are used as "eyes in the sky" and need someone 
to analyze, interpret, and make decisions about what the UASs see. 
Since the pilots of these new domains of UAS operations will have different sets 
of rules to go by, it is important to understand how pilots are selected now and how this 
practice could improve for future pilot selection. Within the branches of the military, the 
primary users of UASs, there is no consistency when it comes to pilot selection. The 
U.S. Air Force, for example, select from UAS pilot candidates who have received formal 
military flight training, but have recently trained specifically for UAS (Brinkerhoff, 
2009). They take graduates who have flown, "airplanes such as B-52, T-38, T-37, and T-
1" and guide through rigorous UAV training, which results in trained pilots to be taken 
away from manned aircraft duties (Pedersen et al., 2006). Furthermore, the U. S. Navy 
and Marine Corp select UAS pilots that already hold a private pilot license, which is 
more of a "middle of the road" approach (McCarley & Wickens, 2004). On the other 
hand, the U. S. Army selects enlisted personnel at boot camp who may or may not have 
flight experience to fly their UASs (Pedersen et al, 2006). The lack of standardization 
does not stop there. There are also major differences between medical qualifications and 
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restrictions, not only from branch to branch, but in the general sense between manned and 
unmanned aircraft pilots. Although some medical qualifications in place for manned 
aircraft pilots, such as a certain level of fitness, may not necessarily be crucial for UAS 
operators considering the different operational environment, some are understandably 
important. Medical restrictions like the one imposed on alcoholics should be mandatory 
across the board since UAS operators will be in air space with manned aircraft, posing a 
major safety concern. 
In order to understand the implications of automation, human trust, workload, 
time pressure on operator performance, there needs to be an understanding of the nature 
of the task. Operating a UAS is different from flying an aircraft. According to McCarley 
and Wickens (2004), "delayed control feedback, poor visual imagery, a small field of 
view, and a general lack of sensory cues [and feedback]" are the major differences 
between operating a UAS and flying an aircraft. Those extra sensory cues give the pilot 
extra information, which usually comes with added experience. Saying that, an 
experienced pilot will not necessarily effectively transfer knowledge and experience from 
their field to UAS operations. Tirre (1998) explains that pilots transitioning from manned 
aircraft to "UAS operations have faced boredom and difficulty maintaining situation 
awareness". UAS operations are cognitively taxing. Weil et al. (2006) point up that 
operators are responsible for "controlling the flight, navigation, status monitoring, flight 
and mission alterations, problem diagnosis, communication and coordination with other 
operators and data analysis and interpretation". They continue by saying that those tasks 
are similar in terms of their "locus of control" but they have different information 
requirements and thus, tap into different cognitive skills, which is were the cognitive 
5 
demands becomes so taxing (Weil et al., 2006). In addition, limited research in this area 
has concluded that there is a wide range of necessary qualifications that exist amongst 
UAS pilots, and more research is crucial to identify the kinds of skills, training and 
previous knowledge that would best fit into UAS operations, while not having a 
counterproductive effect (Weeks, 2000). 
For any use of the UAS, three goals that are directly related to the Human Factors 
field stand true: the ergonomic goal dealing with minimizing physical fatigue, the 
cognitive goal that is preoccupied with minimizing mental fatigue and lastly, the response 
goal which targets minimizing UAV [operation or task] response time (Pedersen et al., 
2006). The present study is particularly interested in the latter while focusing efforts on a 
variation of the cognitive goal as well. In this study, the cognitive goal is more about 
perceived workload, which may be impacted by the operator's trust in the system. In turn, 
operator's trust can be impacted by the reliability of the system and the task at hand. 
In the following sections, we will explore and explain some of the most important 
questions regarding UAS pilots, their performance and the factors that are likely to 
negatively impact it. Due to the nature of the UAS task, the following factors are usually 
involved: decision-making under uncertainty, time pressure and stress, system reliability 
issues and the operator's trust in the system, and overreliance in automation. The study 
strives to focus particularly on those areas to better understand the UAS operator's task, 
how to improve their experience and better address concerns for the future 
implementations of UAS s. 
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Decision-Making under Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a major stressor that is likely to have a negative impact on 
decision-making. Decision-making under uncertainty is an essential part of UAS 
operations, especially in military applications. In military operations, UAS pilots have to 
differentiate between targets and distracters when they are in the field, all while staring at 
a very small screen. These screens may not have the best resolution and may lack 
additional cues to allow the operator an easy discrimination. With the lack of external 
cues and only relying on what the small screen gives them, uncertainty can increase the 
operator's workloads and stress levels while delaying their response to complete a certain 
task; that in turn, can increase their perceived time pressure and thus contribute to poor 
performance. 
Several studies of decision-making, "suggest that judgment depends on 
processing a memory store 'schemata', stereotypical representation of situations 
experienced previously" (Boreham, 1989). Uncertainty has been defined extensively. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) defined uncertainty as consisting of three components: 1) 
the lack of clarity of information, 2) the long time span without definite feedback and 3) 
the general vagueness of causal relationships. Moreover, uncertainty can be classified 
into two quite distinct categories. According to Rastegary and Landy (1993), these two 
categories are: 1) the variability of a given situation and 2) the character of information 
regarding that situation. For the purposes of this study, uncertainty is defined as the 
second category; uncertainty tends to "emphasize the completeness (or lack thereof) of 
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the information a decision maker possesses regarding a given situation" (Rastegary & 
Landy, 1993). 
There are several decision-making models that could illustrate the way a UAS 
operator manages to make decisions under a degree of uncertainty. The 'fast-and-frugal' 
method is a variation of the Probabilistic Mental Models (PMM) (Newell, Weston & 
Shanks, 2003). The authors explain that the 'fast-and-frugal' approach to decision 
making argues that "people 'satisfy' or look for 'good enough' solutions that approximate 
the accuracy of the optimal algorithms without placing too heavy a demand on the 
cognitive system; this aspect of the model may not apply to military operations since 
'good enough' is not quite enough to complete a mission where lives are at stake. In 
military operations, the UAS operator must be very certain when discriminating between 
targets and friendlies. The 'good enough' idea will likely be applicable to border patrol, 
or other civilian applications that not require critical discrimination in behalf of the 
operator. Another part to that idea is called the "take-the-best" heuristic, which will better 
encompass UAS operations in a military domain. This heuristic has three aspects: the 
search rule (search for cues to validate a decision), the stopping rule (stop after the first 
discriminating cue is discovered) and the decision rule (choose the outcome pointed to by 
the first cue that discriminates). The problem comes, as Newell and colleagues found, 
when people do not stop after finding the discriminating cue. Some people tend to seek 
additional information to support their decisions. This could be of critical importance in a 
UAS task considering the lack of time facing a UAS operator. If a UAS operator looks 
for additional, unnecessary information to decide whether or not to do something, they 
could waste precious time. 
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Furthermore, Jha and Bisantz (2001) suggest that a Dynamic Decision Making 
(DDM) task is "a task where the decision maker must make decisions in an uncertain, 
changing and time-pressured environment". These tasks involve a recognition process, 
where decisions are made based on previous experience. Additionally, dynamic decisions 
are defined as having four distinct characteristics: 
1) A series of decisions is required to reach one goal; 
2) Decisions are interdependent. Each decision needs to be understood in the 
context of the other decisions in the series either because they are constrained by 
the earlier decisions, or because they may constrain later decisions; 
3) The state of the decision problem changes over time, either autonomously, 
because of the system makes the decision, or as a consequence of decision 
makers' actions; 
4) Decisions occur in real time. The decision maker must make a decision when 
the environment requires it, not in her or his own time. This is a stress generator, 
which hinders decision performance, since the decision maker under stress reverts 
to simple, more task-oriented modus operandi (Bullen & Sacks, 2003). 
Time Pressure and Stress 
Another important aspect of UAS operations is operator's perceived time pressure 
to successfully complete a task and the stress that they can experience if the pressure 
becomes overwhelming. Controlling a UAS can become quite stressful considering the 
small visual system given to operators to make decisions; it is easy to imagine that the 
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task of discriminating between images can rapidly become taxing if there is a time 
constrain to complete the task. In addition, the lack of sensory cues, such as visual and 
tactile, to inform the operator of current system or task status that could potentially aid 
the operator in making a decision are not available like they are in other aircraft. It is 
important to understand how time pressure affects UAS operators in their ability to make 
correct decisions of critical importance and how stress plays a role in their overall 
experience. 
In an environment with time sensitive decisions such as UAS operations, 
operators are not "free to make decisions when they feel ready to do so. Instead, they 
have to make decisions when the environment demands decisions from them, [which] 
introduces a level of stress" (Brehmer, 1992). Time pressure is a simple concept. Time 
pressure is the perceived demand between the available time and the amount of time 
required to complete a given task. Time pressure affects people in different ways. Some 
people may cope with high time pressure to make a decision by rushing through other 
activities; this will likely end in information overload ultimately resulting in increased 
stress levels. According to Maule et al. (2000), this adaptation in known as acceleration, 
which they explain as, "increasing the speed or tempo of information processing" and add 
that another adaptation strategy is knows as filtration, which dictates, "increased 
selectivity of processing". Since the operator is aware of the need to work harder and 
faster, it will lead to increased anxiety and stress (Maule et al., 2000). 
Perceived time pressure can also prove critical to performance by increasing 
workload and completely overwhelming the operator. Time pressure becomes an 
important factor to be considered in a dynamic environment such as UAS Operations 
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because decisions have to be made immediately. Brehmer (1992) expresses that, "it [is] 
not sufficient to make correct decisions and to make them in the correct order; the 
decisions have to be made at the correct time...dynamic decisions are decisions in 
context and in time". Not all time pressure is bad. People have been found to feel more 
energetic after brief periods of increased workload (Brehmer, 1992). Furthermore, giving 
people deadlines can keep them focused on the task while motivating them to 
successfully bring the task to completion; this can translate in job satisfaction. 
System Reliability 
Complexity in technology has been on the rise for many years. In an effort to help 
the operator, many tasks have been automated to prevent the user from getting 
overwhelmed. As a result of an increase in computer usage, special attention must be paid 
to the human-computer team and its performance. 
With the human-computer team, a mutual reliance exists. The human will have 
assistance from the computer automation, while at the same time the automation relies on 
the human to make ultimate decisions based on its suggestions; but having a computer in 
the loop is not the end of it. It is not just necessary to have the automation take some of 
the work; the automation has to be reliable. Otherwise, instead of reducing operator 
workload, the automation can increase it. The reliability of the automation system is the 
usual sense of proper, consistent and effective functioning (Luz, 2009). Also, "one 
strategy used to optimize human-computer performance has been to call on system 
designers to create automated aids that are increasingly more reliable", expecting that the 
new found assistance can prove beneficial to the operator of the complex system 
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(Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003). The authors explain that even 
though increased reliability is assumed to lead to increased human-computer "team" 
performance, it may not be the case every time. Just like with human teams, increasing 
the reliability of one member's performance will not necessarily translate into better 
team's performance. 
Operators depend on the system's reliability to properly aid them in their task. As 
UAS use continues to proliferate, "the technology involved with the flight control system 
continues to become more and more sophisticated" as if the goal of system designers was 
to removed the human operator al together (Williams, 2006) but the rationale for 
continuing to use a human in the UAS loop, is the "the flexibility that the human brings 
to the human-machine combination" (Oron-Gilad, Chen & Hancock, 2006). In addition, 
human-automation interaction research has shown that automation does not eliminate 
human cognitive demands in their entirety, set up and supervision of that automation is 
still required, with supervision being quite important due to automation being less that 
100% reliable (Wickens et al., 2006). For that reason, system reliability and the ability of 
the operator to trust the system is crucial. The proper use of such automation is directly 
derived from the reliability of the system and the trust the operator can build from using 
that system. Experiments have shown that automation is beneficial when it is perfect and 
it is also detrimental to operator performance when it is unreliable because it degrades 
performance and increases workload (Wickens et al., 2006). The authors indicate that, 
"people generally tend to treat diagnostic automated tasks as 'secondary', buffering the 
'primary;' concurrent tasks from whatever resource demands are imposed by decreasing 
reliability" (Wickens et al., 2006). The finding in the study conducted by Wickens et al. 
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(2006) also showed that pilots might be able to tolerate less than perfect system 
reliability. They suggested that pilots may even be able to tolerate reliability as low as 
80%, but they disclosed that this might only be achievable if the pilots are made aware of 
the reliability level and the source of the imperfection. This is important for the present 
study since participants were not aware of the low reliability or the source of the 
imperfection while at the same time, system reliability being well below the 80% level 
Wickens and others have discussed. 
Human Trust and Overreliance in Automation 
Since studies have shown reduced perceived operator's workload when automation 
is used for a UAS flight, the use of automation in this field has grown significantly 
(Parush, 2006). UASs are heavily automated systems where the operator does more of a 
supervisory job as opposed to actually operating the aircraft. With this increase in 
functionality, consequences such as reduced situational awareness due to inactivity and 
lack of operator involvement in the task, over or under reliance in automation, and 
misunderstanding of automation modes can all occur in the human-automation interaction 
if not considered up front (Weil et al., 2006). According to Peterson (2010), "The level of 
automation implemented in the UAS then becomes an important factor in determining 
how safely and efficiently the system will operate in general, which is why special 
attention must be paid to the human-machine team. Just like in any team, there are 
several issues that can arise from the interaction between automation and a human 
operator. According to Luz (2009), if people don't trust (under-trusting) automation 
support, they will not use it (disuse). On the other hand, when there is too much trust by 
the operator (over-trusting), the operator incurs in lack of attentive monitoring of the 
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system which will likely lead to missing faults in automation (misuse). It is important that 
operator to evaluate the system reliability correctly and build trust on the system 
thereafter. 
In general, trust can be increased when the operator realizes the benefits of using 
automation and understands the functionality and constraints of its tools. The relationship 
of system reliability and trust in automation is illustrated in Figure 1. 
High 
Trust 
Low 
Low System Reliability High 
Figure 1 The Relationship Between System Reliability and Trust in Automation 
Automation can be a very powerful tool for a human operator but if not handled 
carefully, it can hinder the ability of the user in executing the correct response under 
time pressure or an emergency situation as well as increasing their workload. The 
interaction between an autonomous system and the operator is an interesting one, "a 
common paradigm in human-automation interaction requires a human to make a 
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judgment in parallel with an automated system, and then consider, accept of reject the 
automated output as appropriate" (Bisantz & Pritchett, 2003). This becomes a problem 
when the operator becomes over reliant on the system and goes from an active operator 
to a monitor. If the system takes too many responsibilities away from the user, making 
them less involved in what is going on, when an emergency situation happens the 
operator is less equipped to manage it properly. This, in turn, elevates the levels of 
workload immensely and performance usually decreases. Overreliance on automation 
can be extremely critical for UAS missions since important, time-constrained decisions 
can happen in an instant and the operator must be alert, in the loop and able to make the 
right decision. 
In UAS operations, research about workload, trust in automation and system 
reliability and how they affect operator's performance is limited. This study will add to 
the body of knowledge that currently exists about these systems. The expansion that the 
UAS usage will have in the upcoming years will greatly benefit from a better 
understanding of the dynamics between system reliability and human trust and their 
impact of workload and performance when time pressure is added to the mix. 
Research Objective 
The purpose of the study is to broaden the understanding of the effects of system 
reliability and task uncertainty on UAS operator performance. Due to the vast number of 
UAS applications, concerns such as: Are pilots able to use the automation properly when 
it is less than perfect? Does low reliability affect their performance? Can reliable 
automation really have a positive impact on operator's performance? Does low reliability 
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hinder the operator's positive perception of the system automation, therefore affecting 
their performance? Can time pressure become critical when the uncertainty of the 
discrimination task is high? 
The objective is for the study is to find out if under a high time pressure, UAV 
operators are able to correctly discriminate between distracters and threats while properly 
accepting correct automation data or rejecting faulty data based on the two levels of 
system reliability. The uncertainty encompassed in the study, is threat detection; the ease 
of looking at an image with all threats, mixed threats and distracters or all distracters and 
correcting the action the automation has suggested. The effect of system reliability and 
different uncertainty levels on human UAS operators were investigated in this study. 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were tested: 
Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 3: 
Hypotheses 4: 
When participants are exposed to high uncertainty targets, that is, 
all threats or all distracters, they will have a lower accuracy score 
than when presented with low uncertainty targets. 
When participants are exposed to low uncertainty, their primary 
task processing time will be lower than when presented with high 
uncertainty targets. 
When participants are exposed to high system reliability, their 
primary task accuracy scores will be higher than when they are 
presented with low reliability. 
When participants are exposed to high system reliability, their 
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Hypotheses 5: 
Hypothesis 6: 
Hypothesis 7: 
Hypothesis 8: 
Hypothesis 9: 
Hypothesis 10: 
Hypothesis 11: 
Hypothesis 12: 
primary task processing time will be lower than when they are 
presented with low system reliability. 
There is an interaction between reliability and uncertainty for the 
primary task accuracy scores 
There is an interaction effect between reliability and uncertainty 
for the primary task processing time 
When participants are exposed to low uncertainty targets, their 
secondary task time, mission mode indicator MMI processing time 
will be lower than when presented with high uncertainty targets. 
When participants are exposed to high reliability, their secondary 
task time, MMI processing time will be lower than when presented 
with low system reliability. 
When participants are exposed to low uncertainty, their secondary 
task time, pop-up threats processing time will be lower than when 
presented with high uncertainty targets. 
When participants are exposed to high reliability, their secondary 
task time, pop-up threats processing time will be lower than when 
presented with low system reliability. 
When participants are exposed to low uncertainty, their secondary 
task time, Intruder Aircraft (IA) processing time will be lower than 
when presented with high uncertainty targets. 
When participants are exposed to high reliability, their secondary 
task time, Intruder Aircraft (IA) processing time will be lower than 
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when presented with low system reliability. 
Hypothesis 13: There is an interaction between reliability and uncertainty for the 
secondary task time. 
Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-five undergraduate and graduate students from Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University, 15 males (60%) and 10 females (40%) were recruited to 
participate in this study. They were briefed prior to their participation and asked to sign 
an informed consent form. 
Apparatus 
This study used a standard PC running a UAS software test bed simulation device 
called MIIIRO (Multi-modal Immersive Intelligent Interface for Remote Operations). 
The software was designed by IA Tech with support from the Air Force Research 
Laboratory, and is used to conduct research for simulate long range, and high endurance 
UASs (Tso et al., 1999). The setup includes two monitors; the one on the left displayed 
the Tactical Situation Display (TSD). The TSD included a topographical image of the 
operating environment, highlighted routes including waypoints, critical targets, other 
intruding aircraft, and the Mission Mode Indicators (MMI). The secondary monitor 
displayed the Image Management Display (IMD), which included an image cue and 
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image display used for image processing, as shown in Figure 2. 
'«#fl* 
Figure 2 The TSD and IMD using the MIIIRO interface 
Design 
The design utilized a 2x2 within subjects, fully factorial design (Table 1). The 
two independent variables were reliability of the automation and uncertainty of the 
data presented. Five dependent measures were collected in the study across two 
tasks. 
Table 1 
Design of the reliability and uncertainty study 
Reliability 50% 90% 
Uncertainty 
High Low 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Primary task. For this study, the primary task was image processing. Participants 
did not need to control flight directly due to the high level of automation used by the 
system. Waypoints made up the flight path of the UAS. Along the flight path, 10 image 
capture locations were preset to represent each location. Once the UAS reached a 
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waypoint, the designated image was presented to the participants. Each image contained 
at least one terrain vehicle that may have or may have not been a target. Distracters may 
have also been present. The participants were to view the images captured by the aircraft 
onboard camera, and verify that the Automatic Target Recognizer (ATR) had correctly 
selected the targets. The ATR placed a red box around the vehicles it had recognized as 
targets, although the ATR was not always correct. For example, the ATR placed red 
boxes around distracters while not placing them around the targets. In cases where the 
ATR had incorrectly identified distracters as targets or had not recognized a target as one, 
the participant was required to manually select the target and/or deselect the distracter by 
clicking on the images with the mouse. The automation processed the automation's 
suggested action as is, if no input from the operator was received within the 5 seconds 
time limit. The reliability of the ATR was set to 90% and 50% for the two levels of 
reliability. 
The MIIIRO software automatically collected primary task performance measures 
for analyses. These measures included: image processing time, target selection accuracy, 
manual accepts/rejects, and automatic accepts/rejects. 
Secondary task. There were three secondary tasks that the participants needed to 
perform during this study. The first task was the Mission Mode Indicator (MMI). The 
MMI had three round lights organized in a line like a sideways traffic light. It indicated 
the status of the UAS by lighting up the green, yellow, or red light. The lights depicted 
the estate of the system: good health (green), action needed (yellow), and urgent action 
needed (red). The participants needed to click on the light panel when the MMI lighted 
up yellow or red. They then needed to correctly type in a text string that popped up in a 
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window after initiating the action. Once the participants had successfully entered the text 
string presented to them, the MMI lighted up green indicating the new state of the system 
as being in good health. 
The second task in this experiment required the participant to respond to flight 
path changes recommendations made by the automation. Pop-up threats were designed 
into the flight path, but were not visible to the participant until the aircraft had 
encountered them. When the UAS encountered the threats, the automation provided an 
alternate route. The alternate route provided was not always ideal and the participant had 
to choose to accept the new route before it was put in effect or rejected it and continue 
with the original flight plan. 
Lastly, the third task to increase pilot workload consisted of processing an 
Intruder Aircraft (IA), which entered the operational airspace. This task was used to 
imitate unexpected aircraft that may enter airspace during typical UAS operations. This 
was a highly critical situation and required a quick and attentive response. A red aircraft 
shaped icon depicted as the intruder, appeared on the display at random times during the 
experiment. Participants were required to click on the aircraft and enter a predetermined 
code to alleviate the situation. This event occurred twice in each trial. 
Data from all three tasks was automatically collected by the MIIIRO software and 
included the number of events and response times for the MMI and the IA, as well as the 
pop-up threat reroute occurrences. 
Independent variables. The first independent variable (IV) was reliability of the 
system. It had 2 levels: 50% and 90%. When the reliability was set at 50%, 5 images out 
21 
of the 10 images captured by the aircraft onboard camera were correctly processed; the 
automation had red boxes around the targets and no boxes around distracters. This was 
also the case for the 90% reliability where 9 out of the 10 images were correctly 
processed by the automation. The second IV was task uncertainty. It too had 2 levels: 
Low (with comparison) and High (without comparison). For the comparison group, there 
was a mixture of threats and distracters and the participant had a comparison point to 
discriminate one from the other. For the without comparison group, participants were 
presented with either all threats or all distracters and they had to make decisions based on 
what they thought was differentiable on the screen. 
Dependent variables. Performance from the primary task was measured based 
processing time and accuracy scores and the secondary tasks were measured based on 
processing time. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival, each participant was given an informed consent form to sign 
(Appendix A). Then, they were briefed about the primary task as well as the three 
secondary tasks. They were also informed that they could receive extra credit in one 
undergraduate Human Factors class in addition to being eligible for a $50 cash prize if 
they were the overall top performer in the study. Before starting the sequence of 
scenarios, they were able to get themselves familiarized with the software and all the 
tasks as well as ask questions they may have had during a 5-minute trial run. After the 
trial run was completed, the participants were presented with a randomized 
sequence of the experimental scenarios. Each scenario lasted approximately 8 minutes 
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and the total time to complete the study varied from 50 minutes to 1 hour, depending on 
individual breaks between scenarios. 
Results 
The present study was intended to analyze the effects of system reliability and 
task uncertainty on performance of UAS pilots under high time pressure. A repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for each one of the dependent 
variables: primary image processing accuracy, primary image processing time, MMI 
processing time, pop-up threats reroute processing time and IA processing time. The 
significance level was set at alpha ~ .05 and the graphs shown below include standard 
error bars. 
Primary Task 
Primary task image processing accuracy. For the first primary task dependent 
variable (DV), accuracy, an ANOVA was conducted to test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 
3. Hypothesis 1 states that when participants are exposed to high uncertainty targets, that 
is, all threats or all distracters, they will have a lower accuracy score than when presented 
with low uncertainty targets. Hypothesis 3 states that when participants are exposed to 
high system reliability, their primary task accuracy scores will be higher than when they 
are presented with low reliability. The descriptive statistics for accuracy are shown in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Primary Task Accuracy 
Uncertainty 
High Low 
Mean SD 95% C.I Mean SD 95% C.I. 
50% 64.17 20.412 [55.5,72.8] 70.42 19.886 [62.0,78.8] 
Reliability 
90% 72.08 18.645 [64.2,80.0] 68.33 16.854 [61.2,75.5] 
The main effects for system reliability and task uncertainty on accuracy were F(l, 
23)= 1.056, p=.315 and F(l, 23)=. 120, p=J33 respectively. Both did not reach statistical 
significance. The interaction effect between reliability and uncertainty was found to not 
be statistically significant with, F(l, 23)=2.968, and/?=.098. Partial Eta Square was .044 
for reliability and .005 for uncertainty, which means that each factor accounted for 4.4% 
and .5% of the variance respectively. Also, power was low at .166 for reliability and at 
.063 for uncertainty. This means that for reliability, there is 83.4% chance of failing to 
detect an effect that is there and for uncertainty, there is a 93.7% chance. The results are 
shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
ANOVA Source Table for Primary Task Accuracy (%) 
j * TV/ro Z7 2 Observed dj MS F p n _ 
_ \ Power 
1.056 .315 .044 .166 
.120 .733 .005 .063 
2.968 .098 .114 .379 
Reliability 
Uncertainty 
Reliability*Uncertainty 
Error(Reliability) 
Error(Uncertainty) 
1 
1 
1 
23 
23 
204.167 
37.5000 
600.000 
193.297 
313.587 
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Also, Figure 3 shows that based on the data, it seems that when participants were 
exposed to high uncertainty targets, their accuracy scores were lower but according to the 
analysis, the difference was not statistically significant. Hypothesis 1 was not supported 
by the findings. 
Average Image Processing 
Accuracy 
Figure 3 Average Accuracy Scores for High and Low Uncertainty 
As for Hypothesis 3, Figure 4 shows from the data, it appears that when 
participants were exposed to the high reliability condition, they had higher accuracy 
scores, but this too was not found to be statistically significant. 
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Average Image Processing 
Accuracy 
72 
70 
68 
# 66 
64 
62 
60 
High Reliability Low Reliability 
Figure 4 Average Accuracy Scores for High and Low System Reliability 
Primary task image processing time. A separate repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted to analyze the effects of reliability and uncertainty on the second performance 
measure for the primary task, and image processing time. For image processing time, 
hypotheses 2 and 4 stated that: (2) when participants are exposed to low uncertainty, their 
primary task processing time will be lower than when presented with high uncertainty 
targets and (4) whenparticipants are exposed to high system reliability, their primary task 
processing time will be lower than when they are presented with low system reliability, 
respectively. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Primary Task Time (ms) 
Mean 
50% 3607.96 
Reliability 
90% 3272.00 
Uncertainty 
High 
SD 95% C.I Mean 
1029.57 [3173,4042] 3173.58 
1114.72 [2801,3742] 2905.62 
Low 
SD 
768.311 
743.066 
95% C.I. 
[2849, 3498] 
[2591,3219] 
It was found that there was a significant main effect for system reliability with 
F(l, 23)= 7.581 and/?=011. There was also a significant main effect for uncertainty of 
the task with F(l, 23)=8.809 and p=.007. However, the interaction effect between 
reliability and uncertainty was not found to be statistically significant with F(l, 23)= .063 
and p=.804. Partial Eta Square was .248 for reliability and .277 for uncertainty, which 
means that each factor accounted for 24.8% and 27.7% of the variance respectively. Also, 
power was relatively high at .751 for reliability and at .811 for uncertainty. This means 
that for reliability, there is 24.9% chance of failing to detect an effect that is there and for 
uncertainty, there is an 18.9% chance. The ANOVA source table is shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
ANOVA Source Table for Primary Task Processing Time (ms) 
df MS F p T) Observed Power 
Reliability 
Uncertainty 
Reliability*Uncertainty 
Error(Reliability) 
Error(Uncertainty) 
1 2188292.042 7.581 .011* .248 .751 
3847203.375 8.809 .007* .277 .811 
27744.00 
23 288657.911 
23 436733.766 
.063 .804 .003 .057 
* indicated significant factors 
Also, Figure 5 shows that when participants were exposed to low uncertainty 
targets, their processing time was significantly lower. Hypothesis 2 was supported by the 
findings. 
Average Image Processing Time 
High Uncertainty Low Uncertainty 
Figure 5 Average Processing Time for High and Low Uncertainty in (ms) 
In addition, Figure 6 shows that when presented with high system reliability, 
participants processed images quicker than when they were exposed to low system 
reliability. The findings also support hypothesis 4. 
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Average Image Processing Time 
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Figure 6 Average Processing Time for High and Low System Reliability in (ms) 
As for the hypotheses 5 and 6, which relate to the interaction between reliability 
and uncertainty for the primary task accuracy scores (5) and primary task image 
processing time (6), the findings do not support either one of the hypotheses. 
Secondary Tasks Processing Time 
The first secondary task analyzed using repeated measures ANOVA was Mission 
Mode Indicator (MMI) processing time and the descriptive statistics are shown in Table 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for MMI processing time (ms) 
Uncertainty 
High Low 
Mean SD 95% C.I Mean SD 95% C.I. 
50% 8831.3 2336.41 [7845,9818] 9872.75 2890.92 [8652,11093] 
Reliability 
90% 9317.79 2883.66 [8100,10535] 10319.6 2869.78 [9107,11531] 
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It was found that there was a significant main effect for uncertainty of the task, 
F(l, 23)= 15.361, p<.00\. The main effect for reliability of the system was not found to 
be significant, F(\, 23)= 1.697. ^ =.206 and neither was the interaction, F(l, 23)= .002, 
p=.969. Partial Eta Square was .069 for reliability and .400 for uncertainty, which means 
that each factor accounted for 6.9% and 40% of the variance respectively. Also, power 
was low for reliability at .239 for reliability and high for uncertainty at .963. This means 
that although there is 76.1% chance of failing to detect an effect that is there for 
reliability, for uncertainty, there is a very low 3.7% chance of failing to detect an effect. 
The results are shown in Table 7, 
Table 7 
ANOVA Source Table for MMI Processing Time 
,r
 T l / r c rr 2 Observed 
df M S F P
 1 Power 
Reliability 1 5229000.260 1.697 .206 .069 .239 
Uncertainty 1 25050000.00 15.361 .001* .400 .963 
Reliability*Uncertainty 1 9500.260 .002 .969 .000 .050 
Error(Reliability) 23 70870000.00 
Error(Uncertainty) 23 37510000.00 
* indicates significant factors 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that when participants are exposed to low uncertainty, 
their MMI processing time will be lower than when presented with high uncertainty 
targets. This was not supported by the findings (see Figure 7). Therefore, results suggest 
that participants took longer to process the MMI task when the primary task uncertainty 
was low. Hypothesis 8 is not supported either and states that when participants are 
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exposed to high reliability, their MMI processing time will be lower than when presented 
with low system reliability since reliability was not found to be statistically significant. 
Average MMI Processing Time 
12000 
10000 
8000 
f 6000 
4000 
2000 
! o 
High Uncertainty Low Uncertainty 
i j 
Figure 7 Average MMI Processing Time under High and Low Uncertainty in (ms) 
The next secondary task analyzed was pop-up threats reroute processing time. The 
descriptive statistics are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Pop-Up Threats Reroute Processing Time (ms) 
Mean 
50% 2834.75 
Reliability 
90% 3073.27 
Uncertainty 
High 
SD 95% C.I 
902.854 [2453,3216] 
845.464 [2716,3430] 
Mean 
2852.50 
2686.96 
Low 
SD 95% C.I. 
936.908 [2457,3248] 
817.469 [2342,3032] 
The main effects for reliability with F(l, 23)=.077, p=.7S4 and for uncertainty 
with F(l, 23)= 1.780,/?=. 195 were not found to be statistically significant. The interaction 
between reliability and uncertainty also failed to show a significance with F(l, 
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23)=1.850, /?=.187. As previously stated, hypotheses 9 and 10 predicted that when 
participants are exposed to low uncertainty and high reliability their pop-up threats 
reroute processing time will be lower than when presented with high uncertainty targets 
and low system reliability respectively. Since the repeated measures ANOVA did not 
find statistical significance for either one of the IVs nor their interaction, hypothesis 9 
and hypothesis 10 were not supported. The ANOVA source table is shown below (see 
Table 9). 
Table 9 
ANOVA Source Table for Pop-Up Threats Reroute Processing Time (ms) 
, . , , „ „ 2 Observed df M S
 F p T\
 p o w £ r 
Reliability 1 31937.510 .077 .784 .003 .058 
Uncertainty 1 814937.760 1.780 .195 .072 .248 
Reliability*Uncertainty 1 979498.010 1.850 .187 .074 .256 
Error(Reliability) 23 413498.532 
Error(Uncertainty) 23 10530000.00 
Lastly, the Intruder Aircraft (IA) processing time was analyzed for which the 
descriptive statistics are shown below in Table 10. 
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Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics for IA Processing Time (ms) 
Uncertainty 
High Low 
Mean SD 95% C.I Mean SD 95% C.I. 
50% 5630.09 1721.638 [4867,6393] 5501.09 1512.364 [4831,6172] 
Reliability 
90% 6161.18 2094.812 [5232,7090] 5928.41 1491.270 [5267,6590] 
Similarly to the reroute processing time, the ANOVA did not find a statistically 
significant main effect for reliability with F(l, 23)=2.964, p=.\00 or for uncertainty with 
F(l, 23)^.252, p=.62l. The interaction between reliability and uncertainty also failed to 
show a significance with F(l, 23)=.037, p=.S50. The ANOVA source table is shown 
below (see Table 11). 
Table 11 
ANOVA Source Table for IA Processing Time (ms) 
df MS F p n 2 Observed 
Power 
Reliability 1 5052013.92 2.964 .100 .124 .376 
Uncertainty 1 1704728.44 .252 .621 .012 .077 
Reliability*Uncertainty 1 59228.284 .037 .850 .002 .054 
Error(Reliability) 21 1704728.44 
Error(Uncertainty) 21 2853774.38 
Hypotheses 11 and 12 predicted that when participants were exposed to low 
uncertainty targets and high system reliability, IA processing time was going to be lower 
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than when presented with high uncertainty targets and low system reliability respectively. 
Since the findings do not support those predictions, we reject hypothesis 11 as well as 
hypothesis 12. As for hypothesis 13 that deals with the interaction effect between 
reliability and uncertainty and it affecting secondary task time, we reject this hypothesis 
because none of the three secondary tasks processing times showed a statistically 
significant interaction effect. In the next section, the major findings of the study are 
discussed. 
Discussion 
The objective of this study was to examine the effects of system reliability and 
task uncertainty on performance under high time pressure when conducting unmanned 
aerial vehicle operations. The aim of the study was to further the understanding of how 
system reliability and uncertainty of the task can impact performance in highly 
autonomous UASs and use that knowledge to improve future designs as well as 
operators' experience. According to the findings, both system reliability and task 
uncertainty had a significant effect on primary image processing time but not their 
interaction. Furthermore, reliability and uncertainty did not show a statistically significant 
main effect on primary task accuracy and neither did their interaction. Similarly, no 
significance was found for reliability and uncertainty or their interaction, on secondary 
task processing time for intruder aircraft or pop-up threat reroute. Lastly, uncertainty was 
found to have a main effect on MMI processing time but reliability was not found to be 
statistically significant, and neither was the interaction between reliability and 
uncertainty. The results of the performance measures are discussed in two separate 
sections, primary task and secondary tasks. 
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Primary Task 
Primary task performance measures. For the primary task, two different 
performance measures were recorded: image processing accuracy and image processing 
time. System reliability was not found to be significant for primary task accuracy, which 
may be derived from the participant's understanding of the task at hand. Part of the 
briefing explained that the system would be unreliable at least once. Participants knew 
there were two levels of reliability on which they would be tested and that neither of 
which was set up at 100% reliability, but they were not aware of what each level was. A 
possible explanation of the lack of significance of reliability on accuracy is that 
participants were even more careful when identifying targets and distracters and 
processing images in each scenario because they were aware that the system was not set 
up to be 100% reliable at any point in the study. Surprisingly and contrary to the 
hypothesis, uncertainty of the task had no significance on accuracy either. Processing 
both, images where targets and distracters were both present and images where only 
targets or distracters were present, had statistically similar accuracy scores. Participants 
seemed to have had no added difficulty differentiating targets from distracters when 
processing images correctly. The feature difference between targets and distracters was 
only color, not shape or size. 
Moreover, primary task image processing time showed statistical significance for 
both system reliability and task uncertainty but not their interaction. The findings support 
the claim that when the reliability of the system is high participants take less time 
processing the images; not only is there a higher percentage of images correctly 
processed by the automation but there is also less mouse-clicking involved for the 
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incorrect images to be corrected therefore saving the participant some time processing the 
image. That also holds true that when the task uncertainty is low; when participants have 
a way to compare between targets and distracters in an image, they can better 
differentiate between distracters and targets and thus process the image faster. On the 
other hand, the interaction between reliability and uncertainty was not significant, which 
did not support the predictions stipulated. This may be due to the small number of targets 
in each imaged captured. It may be possible that the task was not demanding enough to 
show a significant interaction and increasing the task demand might show an interaction. 
In the next section, the processing times for all three secondary tasks are discussed. 
Secondary Tasks 
Secondary tasks performance measures. Response time data was collected as the 
performance measure for all three secondary tasks and each of which are discussed in the 
following order: mission mode indicator (MMI), pop-up threats reroutes and intruder 
aircraft (IA). In all the secondary tasks the processing times are a reflection of the 
workload experienced by the participants due to system reliability and uncertainty for 
their primary task given that participants used their spare capacity. Since participants had 
to focus primarily on target/distracter image processing when the task was active, their 
processing time with their primary task impacted their processing time for subsequent 
secondary tasks. 
The MMI processing time only showed that it was significantly affected by 
uncertainty; more specifically low uncertainty resulted in higher processing time. This 
finding directly contradicts the prediction that stated that MMI processing time would be 
lower when participants were exposed to low uncertainty since it would be easier for 
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participants to differentiate the targets. The findings showed that MMI processing time 
did not reduce when participants were presented with low uncertainty. A possible reason 
for this could be that because participants had accomplished the primary task quicker, 
they did not feel rushed to input the numeric string presented to them in the pop-up 
window to bring the system back to "good health" status. Participants knew that their 
primary task was completed; they took their time to complete the secondary task. In 
contrast, if participants were presented with high uncertainty on their primary task, and 
they had to rush to make a decision quickly in order to successfully complete that task, 
they may have carried over some of that sense of urgency to the MMI task, hence 
completing it faster. Moreover, system reliability did not show significance in MMI 
processing time. Given that participants knew the automation would be unreliable at least 
once, they may have taken similar care in their primary task image processing across all 
four scenarios, resulting in similar spare time to complete the MMI task. Also, the 
interaction between system reliability and task uncertainty did not show statistical 
significance for similar reasons. The trend of lack of significance continued with the last 
two secondary tasks. 
The findings did not support the claims that high system reliability, low 
uncertainty and their interaction would have an effect on pop-up threats reroute 
processing time and IA processing time. Results showed that pop-up threats reroute 
processing times were similar across the board and participants were not affected by the 
reliability of the system, the tasks uncertainty or the interaction of the two, when it came 
to processing reroutes. A reason for this could be that since they were aware that the 
reroute was a time sensitive task, the participants devoted the same amount of resources 
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to it regardless of how they reacted to the primary task and the different levels of 
reliability and uncertainty presented to them. The IV that affected the primary task had no 
impact on secondary tasks resulting in similar spare capacity. 
In addition, the IA processing time was not impacted by the independent variables 
either. The IA occurred randomly in each scenario, leaving the participant less room to 
respond in advance or plan ahead. Since IA requires the same code input, there might be 
some learning transferred from the second scenario they were presented with to the third 
and fourth. Thus, for IA processing time, the findings did not support the claims that high 
system reliability, low uncertainty and their interaction would have an effect. In the next 
section, the study limitations are explored. 
Study Limitations 
In the present study, uncertainty was measured more effectively for the primary 
task. However, the secondary tasks did not reflect conclusive results and part of that 
might come from secondary tasks processing times being dependent on the primary task 
processing time. In addition, the partial eta squared for the primary task processing time 
was low, showing that only about 20% of the variance could be accounted for by the 
factors. In turn, the observed power for the primary task processing time was not as high, 
leaving room for failure to detect an effect when there is one. Moreover, there were no 
significant interactions in the study, which could have resulted from the primary task not 
being demanding enough to challenge participant's perceived mental workload capacity. 
In addition, due to the nature of the study, where participants are exposed to all levels, 
there may be some learning effects associated with some aspects of the primary task and 
all secondary tasks. Lastly, confounds such as video game proficiency or previous 
exposure to similar UAS software, may have impacted participant's response times and 
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accuracy scores. Some suggestions are explored in the next section, which provides 
recommendation for future research. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
For research in UAS pilot performance, it is usually helpful to evaluate the level 
of perceived workload. The original intention of this study was to also analyze and 
evaluate workload. Due to corrupted data, the current study was not able to evaluate how 
system reliability and task uncertainty may affect perceived workload. Recommendations 
for future studies would be to use NASA-TLX after each on of the scenarios to help 
understand if and how reliability and uncertainty affect perceived workload. 
Also, increasing task fidelity to be more of what UAS pilots experience in their 
stations could shed more light on pilot performance and how to increase it based on 
system reliability and task uncertainty understanding. Providing pilots with a continuous 
visual feedback and not just image captures when they approach a coded waypoint. If a 
flight path provides video-like feedback, the pilot may feel more involved in the task and 
thus processing images more accurately. Their perceived workload levels may increase 
just enough to where they feel they are in the loop, not over relying on the automation 
and keeping a high job satisfaction. 
Furthermore, if at all possible, something that would be interesting to investigate 
would be if adding visual aids to the workstation versus not having visual aids could 
affect the uncertainty of the task, if the visual aid makes the distinction between a target 
and a distracter. Since the findings suggest that having comparison present, that is at least 
one target and one distracter in an image, allows the pilot to make decisions faster. 
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Having something to compare the images the pilot is presented with, can improve their 
accuracy and processing time because they are not likely to have both, targets and 
distracters, present in every one of the images they have to process. 
This type of research will add to the body of knowledge that exists about UAS 
operations. Reporting findings that will improve the pilot experience and their 
performance will increase the usability of these very efficient and effective systems. By 
understanding the implications of system reliability and uncertainty on pilot performance, 
we can better design for the future implementations of UASs. 
Conclusion 
Due to the vast use of UASs in the military, the rapid growth of UAS applications 
in many different domains and the imminent integration into the NAS, it is important to 
broaden the body of knowledge regarding the UAS pilots' mental processes and what 
kind of things affect their performance. The aim of human factors is to foresee areas of 
concern and come up with plausible solutions before those areas become serious 
problems Performance, job satisfaction, pilot selection and workload are amongst the 
areas of interest for UAS operations research. This experiment expands on how system 
reliability and task uncertainty affect one of those, performance. 
The present study has found that pilots processing time is affected by system 
reliability and task uncertainty. The task uncertainty portion may provide important clues 
as to what kind of training pilots should be given. In regards to reliability, the study 
supports what the literature says; when the reliability is high, processing time goes down. 
This indicated that it is important for the reliability of the system to be as good as it can 
40 
be, but something interesting came out of this study. The accuracy was not significantly 
affected by the reliability because, like it was mentioned before, the participants were 
told that the system was wrong at least once. That made them more involved with the 
system and more aware of what they had to do. Pilots may benefit from some kind of 
warning that their system will be wrong so that they can perform better instead of over 
relying on the automation and going from being a significant part of the human-system 
team, to playing a passive role. 
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Appendix A 
IRB Number: 10-135 
Informed Consent Form 
For the study: 
The Effects of System Reliability and Task Uncertainty on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Operator Performance under High Time Pressure 
Conducted by Manuela Jaramillo 
Advisor: Dr. Dahai Liu 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
600 S. Clyde Morris Blvd, Daytona Beach, FL 32114 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of System Reliability and task 
uncertainty on performance and workload. This experiment consists of one session that 
will last approximately forty five minutes. During this session, you will be asked to 
complete four computer-based UAS simulations, fill out a short survey after each one and 
fill out a questionnaire regarding your perceived feeling of workload at the end of the 
session. 
Your participation in this study will help us determine an appropriate level of 
automation and help distinguish potential pilot candidates for future UASs. There are no 
known risks associated with this experiment. The data collected from your participation 
will remain confidential. You will be compensated for your participation with extra 
credit in an undergraduate course and will be eligible to receive a $50.00 cash prize for 
best overall performance. You may terminate your participation at any time. 
Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions, please ask during the 
experiment, or call Manuela Jaramillo at 863.458.2758 or Dr. Dahai Liu at 386.226.6214. 
Statement of Consent 
I acknowledge that my participation in this experiment is entirely voluntary and 
that I am free to withdraw at any time. I have been informed as to the general scientific 
purposes of the experiment and that I will receive extra credit for participation in this 
study and will be eligible to receive $50.00 in the event that I have the best overall task 
performance in the entire study. Prize money is contingent on completion of the study. 
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional information 
regarding the study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full 
satisfaction. 
I have read and fully understand the consent form and I sign it freely and 
voluntarily. 
Participant's Name: ID# 
Participant's Signature: Date 
Experimenter Signature: Date 
45 
